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Abstract
When eliciting opinions from a group of experts, traditional devices used to promote hon-
est reporting assume that there is an observable future outcome. In practice, however, this as-
sumption is not always reasonable. In this paper, we propose a scoring method built on strictly
proper scoring rules to induce honest reporting without assuming observable outcomes. Our
method provides scores based on pairwise comparisons between the reports made by each
pair of experts in the group. For ease of exposition, we introduce our scoring method by illus-
trating its application to the peer-review process. In order to do so, we start by modeling the
peer-review process using a Bayesian model where the uncertainty regarding the quality of
the manuscript is taken into account. Thereafter, we introduce our scoring method to evaluate
the reported reviews. Under the assumptions that reviewers are Bayesian decision-makers and
that they cannot influence the reviews of other reviewers, we show that risk-neutral reviewers
strictly maximize their expected scores by honestly disclosing their reviews. We also show
how the group’s scores can be used to find a consensual review. Experimental results show
that encouraging honest reporting through the proposed scoring method creates more accurate
reviews than the traditional peer-review process.
1 Introduction
In the absence of a well-chosen incentive structure, experts are not necessarily honest when re-
porting their opinions. For example, when reporting subjective probabilities, experts who have a
reputation to protect might tend to produce forecasts near the most likely group consensus, whereas
experts who have a reputation to build might tend to overstate the probabilities of outcomes they
feel will be understated in a possible consensus [Nakazono, 2013]. Hence, an important question
when eliciting experts’ opinions is how to incentivize honest reporting.
Proper scoring rules [Winkler and Murphy, 1968] are traditional devices that incentivize hon-
est reporting of subjective probabilities, i.e., experts maximize their expected scores by honestly
reporting their opinions. However, proper scoring rules rely on the assumption that there is an ob-
servable future outcome, which is not always a reasonable assumption. For example, when market
analysts provide sales forecasts on a potential new product, there is no guarantee that the product
will ever be produced. Hence, the actual number of sales may never be observed.
In this paper, we propose a scoring method for promoting honest reporting amongst a group
of experts when future outcomes are unobservable. In particular, we are interested in settings
where experts observe signals from a multinomial distribution with an unknown parameter. Honest
reporting then means that experts report exactly the signals that they observed. Our scoring method
is built on proper scoring rules. However, different than what is traditionally assumed in the proper
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scoring rules literature, our method does not assume that there is an observable future outcome.
Instead, scores are determined based on pairwise comparisons between experts’ reported opinions.
The proposed method may be used in a variety of settings, e.g., strategic planning, reputation
systems, peer review, etc. When applied to strategic planning, the proposed method may induce
honest evaluation of different strategic plans. A strategic plan is a systematic and coordinated
way to develop a direction and a course for an organization, which includes a plan to allocate the
organization’s resources [Argenti, 1968]. After a candidate strategic plan is discarded, it becomes
nearly impossible to observe what would be the consequences of that plan because strategic plans
are long-term in nature. Hence, a method to incentivize honest evaluations of candidate strategic
plans cannot assume that the result of a strategic plan is observable in the future.
Our method can also be applied to reputation systems to elicit honest feedback. In reputation
systems, individuals rate a product/service after experiencing it, e.g., customer product reviews on
Amazon.com are one such reputation system. Due to the subjective nature of this task, incentives
for honest feedback should not be based on the assumption that an absolute rating exists.
For ease of exposition, we introduce our scoring method by illustrating its application to a
domain where traditionally there are no observable outcomes: the peer-review process. Peer re-
view is a process in which an expert’s output is scrutinized by a number of other experts with
relevant expertise in order to ensure quality control and/or to provide credibility. Peer review is
commonly used when there is no objective way to measure the output’s quality, i.e., when qual-
ity is a subjective matter. Peer review has been widely used in several professional fields, e.g.,
accounting [AICPA: American Institute of CPAs, 2012], law [LSC: Legal Services Commission,
2005], health care [Dans, 1993], etc.
Currently, a popular application of the peer-review process is in online education. Recent years
have seen a surge of massive online open courses, i.e., free online academic courses aimed at large-
scale participation. Some of these courses have attracted tens of thousands of students [Pappano,
2012]. One of the biggest challenges faced by online educators brought by this massive number
of students is the grading process since the available resources (personnel, time, etc.) is often
insufficient. Auto-grading by computers is not always feasible, e.g., courses whose assignments
consist of essay-style questions and/or questions that do not have clear right/wrong answers. Peer
review has been used by some companies like Coursera1 as a way to overcome this issue.
For simplicity’s sake, we focus on peer review as used in modern scientific communication.
The process, as we consider in this paper, can be described as follows: when a manuscript first
arrives at the editorial office of an academic journal, it is first examined by the editor, who might
reject the manuscript immediately because either it is out-of-scope or because it is of unacceptable
quality. Manuscripts that pass this first stage are then sent out to experts with relevant expertise
who are usually asked to classify the manuscript as publishable immediately, publishable after
some revisions, or not publishable at all. Traditionally, the manuscript’s authors do not know the
reviewers’ identities, but the reviewers may or may not know the identity of the authors.
In other words, peer review can be seen as a decision-making process where the reviewers
serve as cognitive inputs that help a decision maker (chair, editor, course instructor, etc.) judge
the quality of a peer’s output. A crucial point in this process is that it greatly depends on the
reviewers’ honesty. In the canonical peer-review process, reviewers have no direct incentives
for honestly reporting their reviews. Several potential problems have been discussed in different
research areas, e.g., bias against female authors, authors from minor institutions, and non-native
English writers [Bornmann et al., 2007, Wenneras and Wold, 1997, Primack and Marrs, 2008,
Newcombe and Bouton, 2009].
In order to illustrate the application of our method to peer review, we start by modeling the
peer-review process as a Bayesian model so as to take the uncertainty regarding the quality of
1http://www.coursera.org/
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the manuscript into account. We then introduce our scoring method to evaluate reported reviews.
We assume that the scores received by reviewers are somehow coupled with relevant incentives,
be they social-psychological, such as praise or visibility, or material rewards through prizes or
money. Hence, we naturally assume that reviewers seek to maximize their expected scores and
that there are no external incentives. We show that reviewers strictly maximize their expected
scores by honestly disclosing their reviews under the additional assumptions that they are Bayesian
decision-makers and that they cannot influence the reviews of other reviewers.
Honesty is intrinsically related to accuracy in our peer-review model: as the number of honest
reviews increases, the distribution of the reported reviews converges to the probability distribution
that represents the quality of the manuscript. We performed peer-review experiments to validate
the model and to test the efficiency of the proposed scoring method. Our experimental results cor-
roborate our theoretical model by showing that the act of encouraging honest reporting through the
proposed scoring method creates more accurate reviews than the traditional peer-review process,
where reviewers have no direct incentives for expressing their true reviews.
In addition to our method for inducing honest reporting, we also propose a method to aggregate
opinions that uses information from experts’ scores. Our aggregation method is general in a sense
that it can be used in any decision-making setting where experts report probability distributions
over the outcomes of a discrete random variable. The proposed method works as if the experts
were continuously updating their opinions in order to accommodate the expertise of others. Each
updated opinion takes the form of a linear opinion pool, where the weight that an expert assigns to
a peer’s opinion is inversely related to the distance between their opinions. In other words, experts
are assumed to prefer opinions that are close to their own opinions, where closeness is defined
by an underlying proper scoring rule. We provide conditions under which consensus is achieved
under our aggregation method and discuss a behavioral foundation of it. Using data from our peer-
review experiments, we find that the consensual review resulting from the proposed aggregation
method is consistently more accurate than the canonical average review.
2 Related Work
In recent years, two prominent methods to induce honest reporting without the assumption of
observable future outcomes were proposed: the Bayesian truth serum (BTS) method [Prelec, 2004]
and the peer-prediction method [Miller et al., 2005].
The BTS method works on a single multiple-choice question with a finite number of alterna-
tives. Each expert is requested to endorse the answer mostly likely to be true and to predict the
empirical distribution of the endorsed answers. Experts are evaluated by the accuracy of their pre-
dictions as well as how surprisingly common their answers are. The surprisingly common criterion
exploits the false consensus effect to promote truthfulness, i.e., the general tendency of experts to
overestimate the degree of agreement that the others have with them.
The score received by an expert from the BTS method has two major components. The first
one, called the information score, evaluates the answer endorsed by the expert according to the
log-ratio of its actual-to-predicted endorsement frequencies. The second component, called the
prediction score, is a penalty proportional to the relative entropy between the empirical distribu-
tion of answers and the expert’s prediction of that distribution. Under the BTS scoring method,
collective honest reporting is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
The BTS method has been used to promote honest reporting in many different domains, e.g.,
when sharing rewards amongst a set of experts [Carvalho and Larson, 2011] and in policy anal-
ysis [Weiss, 2009]. However, the BTS method has two major drawbacks. First, it requires the
population of experts to be large. Second, besides reporting their opinions, experts must also
make predictions about how their peers will report their opinions. While the artificial intelligence
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community has recently addressed the former issue [Witkowski and Parkes, 2012, Radanovic and
Faltings, 2013], the latter issue is still an intrinsic requirement for using the BTS method.
The drawbacks of the BTS method are not shared by the peer-prediction method [Miller et al.,
2005]. In the peer-prediction method, a number of experts experience a product and rate its quality.
A mechanism then collects the ratings and makes payments based on those ratings. The peer-
prediction method makes use of the stochastic correlation between the signals observed by the
experts from the product to achieve a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where every expert reports honestly.
A major problem with the peer-prediction method is that it depends on historical data. For
example, when applied to a peer-review setting, after a reviewer i reports his review, say ri, the
mechanism then estimates reviewer i’s prediction of the review reported by another reviewer j,
P (rj |ri), which is then evaluated and rewarded using a proper scoring rule and reviewer j’s actual
reported review. The mechanism needs to have a history of previously reported reviews for com-
puting P (rj|ri), which is not always a reasonable assumption, e.g., when the evaluation criteria
may change from review to review and when the peer-review process is being used for the first
time. In other words, the peer-prediction method is prone to cold-start problems.
Carvalho and Larson [2012] addressed this issue by making the extra assumption that experts
have uninformative prior knowledge about the distribution of the observed signals. Given this
assumption, honest reporting is induced by simply making pairwise comparisons between reported
opinions and rewarding agreements. In this paper, we extend the method by Carvalho and Larson
[2012] in several ways. First, we show that the assumption of uninformative priors is unnecessary
as long as experts have common prior distributions and this fact is common knowledge. Moreover,
we provide stronger conditions with respect to the underlying proper scoring rule under which
pairwise comparisons induce honest reporting.
Another contribution of our work is a method to aggregate the reported opinions into a sin-
gle consensual opinion. Over the years, both behavioral and mathematical methods have been
proposed to establish consensus [Clemen and Winkler, 1999]. Behavioral methods attempt to
generate agreement through interaction and exchange of knowledge. Ideally, the sharing of infor-
mation leads to a consensus. However, behavioral methods usually provide no conditions under
which experts can be expected to reach an agreement. On the other hand, mathematical aggre-
gation methods consist of processes or analytical models that operate on the reported opinions in
order to produce a single aggregate opinion. DeGroot [1974] proposed a model which describes
how a group of experts can reach agreement on a consensual opinion by pooling their individual
opinions. A drawback of DeGroot’s method is that it requires each expert to explicitly assign
weights to the opinions of other experts. In this paper, we propose a method to set these weights
directly which takes the scores received by the experts into account. We also provide a behavioral
interpretation of the proposed aggregation method.
A related method for finding consensus was proposed by Carvalho and Larson [2013]. Under
the assumption that experts prefer probability distributions close to their own distributions, where
closeness is measured by the root-mean-square deviation, the authors showed that a consensus
is always achieved. Moreover, if risk-neutral experts are rewarded using the quadratic scoring
rule, then the assumption that experts prefer probability distributions that are close to their own
distributions follows naturally. The approach in this paper is more general because the underlying
proper scoring rule can be any bounded proper scoring rule.
From an empirical perspective, we investigate the efficiency of both our scoring method and
our method for finding consensus in a peer-review experiment. Formal experiments involving
peer review are still relatively scarce. Even though the application of the peer-review process to
scientific communication can be traced back almost 300 years, it was not until the early 1990s that
research on this matter became more intensive and formalized [van Rooyen, 2001]. Scientists in
the biomedical domain have been in the forefront of research on the peer-review process due to
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the fact that dependable quality-controlled information can literally be a matter of life and death
in this research field. In particular, the staff of the renowned BMJ, formerly British Medical
Journal, have been studying the merits and limitations of peer review over a number of years
[Lock, 1985, Godlee et al., 2003]. Most of their work has focused on defining and evaluating
review quality [van Rooyen et al., 1999], and examining the effect of specific interventions on the
quality of the resulting reviews [van Rooyen, 2001].
One mechanism used to prevent bias in the peer-review process is called double-blind review,
which consists of hiding both authors and reviewers’ identities. Indeed, it has been reported that
such a practice reduces bias against female authors [Budden et al., 2008]. However, it can be
argued that knowing the authors’ identities makes it easier for the reviewers to compare the new
manuscript with previously published papers, and it also encourages the reviewers to disclose con-
flicts of interest. Another argument that undermines the benefits of double-blind reviewing is that
the authorship of the manuscript is often obvious to a knowledgeable reader from the context, e.g.,
self-referencing, research topic, writing style, working paper repositories, seminars, etc. [Falagas
et al., 2006, Justice et al., 1998, Yankauer, 1991]. Furthermore, this mechanism does not prevent
against certain types of bias, e.g., when a reviewer rejects new evidence or new knowledge because
it contradicts established norms, beliefs or paradigms.
Some work has focused on the calibration aspect of peer review. Roos et al. [2011] proposed a
maximum likelihood method for calibrating reviews by estimating both the bias of each reviewer
and the unknown ideal score of the manuscript. Bias is treated as the general rigor of a reviewer
across all his reviews. Hence, Roos et al.’s method does not attempt to prevent bias by rewarding
honest reporting. Instead, it adjusts reviews a posteriori so that they can be globally comparable.
Instead of calibrating reviews a posteriori, Robinson [2001] suggested to “calibrate” review-
ers a priori. Reviewers are first asked to review short texts that have gold-standard reviews, i.e.,
reviews of high quality provided by experts with relevant expertise. Thereafter, they receive cali-
bration scores, which are later used as weighting factors to determine how well their future reviews
will be considered. This approach, however, does not guarantee that reviewers will report honestly
after the calibration phase, when gold-standard reviews are no longer available.
To the best of our knowledge, our peer-review experiments are the first to investigate the use of
incentives for honest reporting in a peer-review task. When objective verification is not possible,
as in the peer-review process, economic measures may be used to encourage experts to honestly
disclose their opinions. The proposed scoring method does so by making pairwise comparisons
between reported reviews and rewarding agreements.
Rewarding experts based on pairwise comparisons has been empirically proven to be an ef-
fective incentive technique in other domains. Shaw et al. [2011] measured the effectiveness of a
collection of social and financial incentive schemes for motivating experts to conduct a qualitative
content analysis task. The authors found that treatment conditions that provided financial incen-
tives and asked experts to prospectively think about the responses of their peers produced more
accurate responses. Huang and Fu [2013] showed that informing the experts that their rewards will
be based on how similar their responses are to other experts’ responses produces more accurate
responses than telling the experts that their rewards will be based on how similar their responses
are to gold-standard responses. Our work adds to the existing body of literature by theoretically
and empirically showing that pairwise comparisons make the peer-review process more accurate.
5
3 The Basic Model
In our proposed peer-review process, a manuscript is reviewed by a set of reviewersN = {1, . . . , n},
with n ≥ 2. The quality of the manuscript is represented by a multinomial distribution2 Ω with
unknown parameter ω = (ω0, . . . , ωv), where v ∈ N+ represents the best evaluation score that the
manuscript can receive and ωk is the probability assigned to the evaluation score being equal to k.
Each reviewer is modeled as possessing a privately observed draw (signal) from Ω. Hence,
our model captures the uncertainty of the reviewers regarding the quality of the manuscript. We
extend the model to multiple observed signals in Section 5. We denote the honest review of each
reviewer i ∈ N by ti ∼ Ω, where ti ∈ {0, . . . , v}. Honest reviews are independent and identically
distributed, i.e., P (ti|tj) = P (ti). We say that reviewer i is reporting honestly when his reported
review ri is equal to his honest review, i.e., ri = ti.
Reviews are elicited and aggregated by a trusted entity referred to as the center3, which is also
responsible for rewarding the reviewers. Let si be reviewer i’s review score after he reports ri.
We discuss how si is determined in Section 4. Review scores are somehow coupled with relevant
incentives, be they social-psychological, such as praise or visibility, or material rewards through
prizes or money. We make four major assumptions in our model:
1. Autonomy: Reviewers cannot influence other reviewers’ reviews, i.e., they do not know each
other’s identity and they are not allowed to communicate to each other during the reviewing
process.
2. Risk Neutrality: Reviewers behave so as to maximize their expected review scores.
3. Dirichlet Priors: There exists a common prior distribution over ω, i.e., P (ω). We assume
that this prior is a Dirichlet distribution and this is common knowledge.
4. Rationality: After observing ti, every reviewer i ∈ N updates his belief by applying Bayes’
rule to the common prior, i.e., P (ω|ti).
The first assumption describes how peer review is traditionally done in practice. The sec-
ond assumption means that reviewers are self-interested and no external incentives exist for each
reviewer. The third assumption means that reviewers have common prior knowledge about the
quality of the manuscript, a natural assumption in the peer-review process. We discuss the formal
meaning of such an assumption in the following subsection. The fourth assumption implies that
the posterior distributions are consistent with Bayesian updating, i.e.:
P (ω|ti) =
P (ti|ω)P (ω)
P (ti)
The last three assumptions imply that reviewers are Bayesian decision-makers. We note that
different modeling choices could have been used, e.g., models based on games of incomplete
information. Unlike our model, an incomplete-information game is often used when experts do not
know each other’s beliefs. To find strategic equilibria in such incomplete-information models, one
would need information about experts’ beliefs about each other’s private information. A Bayesian
structure could be used to model each expert’s beliefs about the others, and it would permit the
calculation of experts’ expected scores, which are maximized at equilibrium. However, the natural
autonomy assumption makes such a Bayesian structure unrealistic.
2We use the term multinomial distribution to refer to the generalization of the Bernoulli distribution for discrete
random variables with any constant number of outcomes. The parameter of this distribution is a probability vector that
specifies the probability of each possible outcome.
3We refer to a single reviewer as “he” and to the center as “she”.
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3.1 Dirichlet Distributions
An important assumption in our model is that reviewers have Dirichlet priors over distributions of
evaluation scores. The Dirichlet distribution can be seen as a continuous distribution over param-
eter vectors of a multinomial distribution. Since ω is the unknown parameter of the multinomial
distribution that describes the quality of the manuscript, then it is natural to consider a Dirichlet
distribution as a prior for ω. Given a vector of positive integers, α = (α0, . . . , αv), that determines
the shape of the Dirichlet distribution, the probability density function of the Dirichlet distribution
over ω is:
P (ω|α) =
1
β(α)
v∏
k=0
ωαk−1k (1)
where:
β(α) =
∏v
k=0(αk − 1)!
(
∑v
k=0 αk − 1)!
Figure 1 shows the above probability density when v = 2 for some parameter vectors α.
For the Dirichlet distribution in (1), the expected value of ωj is E[ωj|α] = αi/
∑v
k=0 αk. The
probability vector E[ω|α] = (E[ω0|α], . . . ,E[ωv|α]) is called the expected distribution regarding
ω.
An interesting property of the Dirichlet distribution is that it is the conjugate prior of the
multinomial distribution [Bernardo and Smith, 1994], i.e., the posterior distribution P (ω|α, ti)
is itself a Dirichlet distribution. This relationship is often used in Bayesian statistics to estimate
hidden parameters of multinomial distributions. To illustrate this point, suppose that reviewer i
observes the signal ti = x, for x ∈ {0, . . . , v}. After applying Bayes’ rule, reviewer i’s posterior
distribution is P (ω|α, ti = x) = P (ω|(α0, α1, . . . , αx + 1, . . . αv)). Consequently, the new
expected distribution is:
E[ω|α, ti = x] =
(
α0
1 +
∑v
k=0 αk
,
α1
1 +
∑v
k=0 αk
, . . . ,
αx + 1
1 +
∑v
k=0 αk
, . . . ,
αv
1 +
∑v
k=0 αk
)
(2)
We call the probability vector in (2) reviewer i’s posterior predictive distribution regarding
ω because it provides the distribution of future outcomes given the observed data ti. With this
perspective, we regard the values α0, . . . , αv as “pseudo-counts” from “pseudo-data”, where each
αk can be interpreted as the number of times that the ωk-probability event has been observed
before.
Throughout this paper, we assume that reviewers have common prior Dirichlet distributions
and this fact is common knowledge, i.e., the value of α is initially the same for all reviewers. A
practical interpretation of this assumption is that reviewers have common prior knowledge about
the quality of the manuscript, i.e., reviewers have a common expectation regarding the quality of
arriving manuscripts.
By using Dirichlet distributions as priors, belief updating can be expressed as an updating
of the parameters of the prior distribution4 . Furthermore, the assumption of common knowledge
4We note that other priors could have been used. However, the inference process would not necessarily be analyti-
cally tractable. In general, tractability can be obtained through conjugate distributions. Hence, another modeling choice
is to consider that evaluation scores follow a normal distribution with unknown parameters. Assuming exchangeability,
we can then use either the normal-gamma distribution or the normal-scaled inverse gamma distribution as the conjugate
prior [Bernardo and Smith, 1994]. The major drawback with this approach is that continuous evaluation scores might
bring extra complexity to the reviewing process.
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Figure 1: Probability densities of Dirichlet distributions when v = 2 for different parameter
vectors. Left: α = (1, 1, 1). Center: α = (2, 1, 1). Right: α = (2, 2, 2).
allows the center to estimate reviewers’ posterior distributions based solely on their reported re-
views, a point which is explored by our proposed scoring method. Due to its attractive theoretical
properties, the Dirichlet distribution has been used to model uncertainty in a variety of different
scenarios, e.g, when experts are sharing a reward based on peer evaluations [Carvalho and Larson,
2012] and when experts are grouped based on their individual differences [Navarro et al., 2006].
4 Scoring Method
In this section, we propose a scoring method to induce honest reporting of reviews. The proposed
method is built on proper scoring rules [Winkler and Murphy, 1968].
4.1 Proper Scoring Rules
Consider an uncertain quantity with possible outcomes o0, . . . , ov, and a probability vector z =
(z0, . . . , zv), where zk is the probability value associated with the occurrence of outcome ok. A
scoring rule R(z, e) is a function that provides a score for the assessment z upon observing the
outcome oe, for e ∈ {0, . . . , v}. A scoring rule is called strictly proper when an expert receives his
maximum expected score if and only if his stated assessment z corresponds to his true assessment
q = (q0, . . . , qv) [Winkler and Murphy, 1968]. The expected score of z at q for a real-valued
scoring rule R(z, e) is:
Eq [R(z, e)] =
v∑
e=0
qeR(z, e)
8
Proper scoring rules have been used as a tool to promote honest reporting in a variety of do-
mains, e.g., when sharing rewards amongst a set of experts based on peer evaluations [Carvalho
and Larson, 2010, 2012], to incentivize experts to accurately estimate their own efforts to accom-
plish a task [Bacon et al., 2012], in prediction markets [Hanson, 2003], in weather forecasting
[Gneiting and Raftery, 2007], etc. Some of the best known strictly proper scoring rules, together
with their scoring ranges, are:
logarithmic: R(z, e) = log ze (−∞, 0]
quadratic: R(z, e) = 2ze −
v∑
k=0
z2k [−1, 1] (3)
spherical: R(z, e) = ze√∑v
k=0 z
2
k
[0, 1]
All the above scoring rules are symmetric, i.e., R((z0, . . . , zv), e) = R((zpi0 , . . . , zpiv ), pie),
for all probability vectors z = (z0, . . . , zv), for all permutations pi on v + 1 elements, and for
all outcomes indexed by e ∈ {0, . . . , v}. We say that a scoring rule is bounded if R(z, e) ∈ R,
for all probability vectors z and e ∈ {0, . . . , v}. For example, the logarithmic scoring rule is
not bounded because it might return −∞ whenever the probability vector z contains an element
equal to zero, whereas both the quadratic and spherical scoring rules are always bounded. A
well-known property of strictly proper scoring rules is that they are still strictly proper under
positive affine transformations [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007], i.e., argmaxzEq [γR(z, e) + λ] =
argmaxzEq [R(z, e)] = q, for a strictly proper scoring rule R, γ > 0, and λ ∈ R.
Proposition 1. If R(z, e) is a strictly proper scoring rule, then a positive affine transformation of
R, i.e., γR(z, e) + λ, for γ > 0 and λ ∈ R, is also strictly proper.
4.2 Review Scores
If we knew a priori reviewers’ honest reviews, we could then compare the honest reviews to
the reported reviews and reward agreement. However, due to the subjective nature of the peer-
review process, we are facing a situation where this objective truth is practically unknowable.
Our solution is to induce honest reporting through pairwise comparisons of reported reviews.
The first step towards computing each reviewer i’s review score is to estimate his posterior pre-
dictive distribution E[ω|α, ti] shown in (2) based on his reported review ri. Let E[ω|α, ri] =
(E[ω0|α, ri], . . . ,E[ωv|α, ri]) be such an estimation, where:
E[ωk|α, ri] =
{
αk+1
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
if ri = k,
αk
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
otherwise. (4)
Recall that the elements of reviewer i’s true posterior predictive distribution are defined as:
E [ωk|α, ti] =
{
αk+1
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
if ti = k,
αk
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
otherwise.
Clearly, E [ωk|α, ri] = E [ωk|α, ti] if and only if reviewer i is reporting honestly, i.e., when
he reports ri = ti. The review score of reviewer i is determined as follows:
si =
∑
j 6=i
(γR (E [ω|α, ri] , rj) + λ) (5)
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where γ and λ are constants, for γ > 0 and λ ∈ R, and R is a strictly proper scoring rule. Scoring
rules require an observable outcome, or a “reality”, in order to score an assessment. Intuitively,
we consider each review reported by every reviewer other than reviewer i as an observed outcome,
i.e., the evaluation score deserved by the manuscript, and then we score reviewer i’s estimated
posterior predictive distribution in (4) as an assessment of that value.
Proposition 2. Each reviewer i ∈ N strictly maximizes his expected review score if and only if
ri = ti.
Proof. Let Θi = E [ω|α, ti] and Φi = E [ω|α, ri]. By the autonomy assumption, reviewers
cannot affect their peers’ reviews. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to show that each reviewer
i ∈ N strictly maximizes EΘi [γR (Φi, rj) + λ], for j 6= i, if and only if ri = ti.
(If part) Since R is a strictly proper scoring rule, from Proposition 1 we have that:
argmax
Φi
EΘi [γR (Φi, rj) + λ] = Θi
If ri = ti, then by construction Φi = Θi, i.e., the estimated posterior predictive distribution
in (4) is equal to the true posterior predictive distribution in (2). Consequently, honest reporting
strictly maximizes reviewers’ expected review scores.
(Only-if part). Using a similar argument, given that R is a strictly proper scoring rule, from
Proposition 1 we have that:
argmax
Φi
EΘi [γR (Φi, rj) + λ] = Θi
By construction, Φi = Θi if and only if ri = ti (see equations (2) and (4)). Thus, reviewers’
expected review scores are strictly maximized only when reviewers are honest.
Another way to interpret the above result is to imagine that each reviewer is betting on the
review deserved by the manuscript. Since the most relevant information available to him is the
observed signal, then the strategy that maximizes his expected review score is to bet on that signal,
i.e., to bet on his honest review. When this happens, the true posterior predictive distribution in
(2) is equal to the estimated posterior predictive distribution in (4) and, consequently, the expected
score resulting from a strictly proper scoring rule is strictly maximized when the expectation is
taken with respect to the true posterior predictive distribution.
It is important to observe that by incentivizing honest reporting, the scoring function in (5)
also incentivizes accuracy since honest reviews are draws from the distribution that represents the
true quality of the manuscript. In other words, the center is indirectly observing these draws when
reviewers report honestly. Consequently, due to the law of large numbers, the distribution of the
reported reviews converges to the distribution that represents the true quality of the manuscript as
the number of honestly reported reviews increases. Our experimental results in Section 7 show
that there indeed exists a strong correlation between honesty and accuracy.
Different interpretations of the scoring method in (5) arises depending on the underlying
strictly proper scoring rule and the hyperparameter α. In the following subsections, we discuss
two different interpretations: 1) when R is a symmetric and bounded strictly proper scoring rule
and reviewers’ prior distributions are non-informative; and 2) when R is a strictly proper scoring
rule sensitive to distance.
4.3 Rewarding Agreement
Assume that reviewers’ prior distributions are non-informative, i.e., all the elements making up
the hyperparameter α have the same value. This happens when reviewers have no relevant prior
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knowledge about the quality of the manuscript. Consequently, the elements of reviewers’ true and
estimated posterior predictive distributions can take on only two possible values (see equations (2)
and (4) for α0 = α1 = · · · = αv ).
Moreover, if R is a symmetric scoring rule, then the term R (E [ω|α, ri] , rj) in (5) can
take on only two possible values because a permutation of elements with similar values does
not change the score of a symmetric scoring rule. When R is also strictly proper, it means that
R (E [ω|α, ri] , rj) = δmax, when ri = rj , and R (E [ω|α, ri] , rj) = δmin, when ri 6= rj , where
δmax > δmin. Consequently, each term of the summation in (5) can be written as:
γR (E [ω|α, ri] , rj) + λ =
{
γδmax + λ if ri = rj,
γδmin + λ otherwise.
When R is also bounded, we can then set γ = 1
δmax−δmin
and λ = −δmin
δmax−δmin
, and the
above values become, respectively, 1 and 0. Hence, the resulting review scores do not depend on
parameters of the model. Moreover, we obtain an intuitive interpretation of the scoring method in
(5): whenever two reported reviews are equal to each other, the underlying reviewers are rewarded
by one payoff unit. Thus, in practice, our scoring method works by simply comparing reported
reviews and rewarding agreements whenever R is a symmetric and bounded strictly proper scoring
rule and reviewers have no informative prior knowledge about the quality of the manuscript.
Another interesting point is that the center can reward different agreements in different ways,
i.e., reviewers are not necessarily equally valued. For example, if the center knows a priori that
a particular reviewer j is reliable (respectively, unreliable), then she can increase (respectively,
decrease) the reward of reviewers whose reviews are in agreement with reviewer j’s reported
review. Formally, this means that for different reviewers i and j, the center can use different
values for γ and λ in (5). Proposition 2 is not affected by this as long as γ > 0, λ ∈ R, and
their values are independent of the reported reviews. Hence, by having a few reliable reviewers,
this approach might help to eliminate the hypothetical scenario where a set of reviewers learn over
time to report similar reviews. A similar idea was proposed by Jurca and Faltings [2009] to prevent
collusions in reputation systems.
4.4 Strictly Proper Scoring Rules Sensitive to Distance
Pairwise comparisons, as defined in the previous subsection, might work well for small values of
v, the best evaluation score that the manuscript can receive, but it can be too restrictive and, to
some degree, unfair when the best evaluation score is high. For example, when v = 10 and the
review used as the observed outcome is also equal to 10, a reported review equal to 9 seems to be
more accurate than a reported review equal to 1. One effective way to deal with these issues is by
using strictly proper scoring rules in (5) that are sensitive to distance.
Using the notation of Section 4.1, recall that z = (z0, . . . , zv) is some reported probability
distribution. Given that the outcomes are ordered, we denote the cumulative probabilities by capital
letter: Zk =
∑
j≤k zj . We first define the notion of distance between two probability vectors as
proposed by Stae¨l von Holstein [1970]. We say that a probability vector z′ is more distant from
the jth outcome than a probability vector z 6= z′ if:
Z ′k ≥ Zk, for k = 0, . . . , j − 1
Z ′k ≤ Zk, for k = j, . . . , v
Intuitively, the above definition means that z can be obtained from z′ by successively moving
probability mass towards the jth outcome from other outcomes [Stae¨l von Holstein, 1970]. A
scoring rule R is said to be sensitive to distance if R(z, j) > R(z′, j) whenever z′ is more distant
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Figure 2: Scores returned by R (E [ω|α, ri] , j) for different reported reviews when v = 4, R is the
RPS rule, and α = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Each line represents a different value for j (observed outcome).
from z for all j. Epstein [1969] introduced the ranked probability score (RPS), a strictly proper
scoring rule that is sensitive to distance. Using the formulation of Epstein’s result proposed by
Murphy [1970], we have for a probability vector z and an observed outcome j ∈ {0, . . . , v}:
RPS(z, j) = −
j−1∑
k=0
Z2k −
v∑
k=j
(1− Zk)
2 (6)
Figure 2 illustrates the scores returned by (6) for different reported reviews and values for j
when reviewers’ prior distributions are non-informative. When using RPS as the strictly proper
scoring rule in (5), reviewers are rewarded based on how close their reported reviews are to the
reviews taken as observed outcomes. For example, when the review used as the observed outcome
is equal to 0 (see the dotted line with squares in Figure 2), the returned score monotonically
decreases as the reported review increases. Since RPS is strictly proper, Proposition 2 is still
valid for any hyperparameter α, i.e., each reviewer strictly maximizes his expected review score
by reporting honestly. The scoring range of RPS is [−v, 0]. Hence, review scores are always
non-negative when using γ = 1 and λ = v in (5).
4.5 Numerical Example
Consider four reviewers (n = 4) and the best evaluation score being equal to four (v = 4). Suppose
that reviewers have non-informative Dirichlet priors with α = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and that reviewers
1, 2, 3, and 4 report, respectively, r1 = 0, r2 = 0, r3 = 1, and r4 = 4. From (4), the resulting
estimated posterior predictive distributions are, respectively, E[ω|α, r1 = 0] =
(
2
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
,
E[ω|α, r2 = 0] =
(
2
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, E[ω|α, r3 = 1] =
(
1
6 ,
2
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, and E[ω|α, r4 = 4] =(
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
2
6
)
. In what follows, we illustrate the scores returned by (5) when using a symmetric
and bounded strictly proper scoring rule and when using RPS.
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4.5.1 Rewarding Agreements
Assume that R in (5) is the quadratic scoring rule shown in (3), which in turn is symmetric,
bounded, and strictly proper. Consequently, as discussed in Section 4.3, the term γR (E[ω|α, ri], rj)+
λ in (5) can take on only two values:
γ
(
4
v+2 −
(
2
v+2
)2
−
∑v−1
e=0
(
1
v+2
)2)
+ λ if ri = rj ,
γ
(
2
v+2 −
(
2
v+2
)2
−
∑v−1
e=0
(
1
v+2
)2)
+ λ otherwise.
Hence, by setting γ = 1
δmax−δmin
= v+22 and λ =
−δmin
δmax−δmin
= −v2v+4 , the above values are
equal to, respectively, 1 and 0. Using the scoring method in (5), we obtain the following review
scores: s1 = s2 = 1 and s3 = s4 = 0. That is, the review scores received by reviewers 1 and 2
are similar due to the fact that r1 = r2. Reviewer 3 and 4’s review scores are equal to 0 because
there is no match between their reported reviews and others’ reported reviews.
4.5.2 Taking Distance into Account
Now, assume that R in (5) is the RPS rule shown in (6). In order to ensure non-negative review
scores, let γ = 1 and λ = v = 4 . Using the scoring method in (5), we obtain the following review
scores: s1 = s2 = (−0.8333γ+λ)+(−0.5γ+λ)+(−1.5γ+λ) = 9.1667, s3 = 2 ·(−1.0833γ+
λ) + (−1.4167γ + λ) = 8.4167, and s4 = 2 · (−1.5γ + λ) + (−0.8333γ + λ) = 8.1667. The
review score of reviewer 4 is the lowest because his reported review is the most different review,
i.e., it has the largest distance between it and all of the other reviews.
5 Multiple Criteria
In our basic model, reviewers observe only one signal from the distribution that represents the
quality of the manuscript. However, manuscripts are often evaluated under multiple criteria, e.g.,
relevance, clarity, originality, etc., meaning that in practice reviewers might observe multiple sig-
nals and report multiple evaluation scores. Under the assumption that these signals are indepen-
dent, each reported evaluation score can be scored individually using the same scoring method
proposed in the previous section. Clearly, Proposition 2 is still valid, i.e., honest reporting still
strictly maximizes reviewers’ expected review scores.
The lack of relationship between different criteria is not always a reasonable assumption. A
modeling choice that takes the relationship between observed signals into account, which is also
consistent with our basic model, is to assume that the quality of the manuscript is still represented
by a multinomial distribution, but now reviewers may observe several signals from that distribu-
tion. Formally, let ρ ∈ N+ be the number of draws from the distribution that represents the quality
of the manuscript, where each signal represents an evaluation score related to a criterion. Instead
of a single number, each reviewer i’s private information is now a vector: ti = (ti,1, . . . , ti,ρ),
where ti,k ∈ {0, . . . , v}, for k ∈ {1, . . . , ρ}. The basic assumptions (autonomy, risk neutrality,
Dirichlet priors, and rationality) are still the same. For ease of exposition, we denote reviewer i’s
true posterior predictive distribution in this section by Θ(ρ)i = E [ω|α, ti]. Under this new model,
each reviewer i’s posterior predictive distribution is now defined as:
Θ
(ρ)
i =
(
α0 +
∑ρ
k=1H(0, ti,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
,
α1 +
∑ρ
k=1H(1, ti,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
, . . . ,
αv +
∑ρ
k=1H(v, ti,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
)
(7)
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where H(x, y) is an indicator function:
H(x, y) =
{
1 if x = y,
0 otherwise.
Assuming that each reported review is a vector of ρ evaluations scores, i.e., ri = (ri,1, . . . , ri,ρ),
where ri,k ∈ {0, . . . , v}, for i ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , ρ}, the center estimates each reviewer i’s pos-
terior predictive distribution by applying Bayes’ rule to the common prior. The resulting estimated
posterior predictive distribution E [ω|α, ri], referred to as Φ(ρ)i for ease of exposition, is:
Φ
(ρ)
i =
(
α0 +
∑ρ
k=1H(0, ri,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
,
α1 +
∑ρ
k=1H(1, ri,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
, . . . ,
αv +
∑ρ
k=1H(v, ri,k)
ρ+
∑v
x=0 αx
)
(8)
Thereafter, the center rewards Φ(ρ)i by using a strictly proper scoring rule R and other review-
ers’ reported reviews as observed outcomes:
si =
∑
j 6=i
(
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
i , G(rj)
)
+ λ
)
(9)
where G is some function used by the center to summarize each reviewer j’s reported review
in a single number, and whose image is equal to the set {0, . . . , v}. For example, G can be a
function that returns the median or the mode of the reported evaluation scores. Honest reporting,
i.e., ri = ti, maximizes reviewers’ expected review scores under this setting.
Proposition 3. When observing and reporting multiple signals, each reviewer i ∈ N maximizes
his expected review score when ri = ti.
Proof. Due to the autonomy assumption, we restrict ourselves to show that each reviewer i ∈ N
maximizes E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
i , G(rj)
)
+ λ
]
, for j 6= i, when ri = ti. Given that R is a strictly
proper scoring rule, from Proposition 1 we have that:
argmax
Φ
(ρ)
i
E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
i , G(rj)
)
+ λ
]
= Θ
(ρ)
i
When ri = ti, we have by construction that Φ(ρ)i = Θ
(ρ)
i (see equations (7) and (8)). Thus,
reviewers’ expected review scores are maximized when reviewers report honestly.
When observing and reporting multiple evaluation scores, a reviewer can weakly maximize
his expected review score by reporting a review different than his true review as long as the es-
timated posterior predictive distributions are the same. For example, when reviewer i reports
ri = (1, 2, 3), the resulting estimated posterior predictive distribution is the same as when he re-
ports ri = (3, 1, 2), and, consequently, reviewer i receives the same review score in both cases.
This implies that the scoring method in (9) is more suitable to a peer-review process where all
criteria are equally weighted since honest reporting weakly maximizes expected review scores.
5.1 Summarizing Signals when Prior Distributions are Non-Informative
When reviewers report multiple evaluation scores, the intuitive interpretation of review scores as
rewards for agreements that arises when using symmetric and bounded strictly proper scoring rules
(see Section 4.3) is lost because the elements of the estimated posterior predictive distribution in
(8) can take on more than two different values.
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A different approach that preserves the aforementioned intuitive interpretation when reviewers’
prior distributions are non-informative is to ask the reviewers to summarize their observed signals
into a single value before reporting it, instead of the center doing it on their behalf. Hence, each
reviewer i is now reporting honestly when ri = G(ti), where G is some function suggested by
the center whose image is equal to the set {0, . . . , v}. This new model can be interpreted as if
the reviewers were reviewing the manuscript under several criteria and reporting the manuscript’s
overall evaluation score by reporting the value G(ti).
Since reviewers are reporting only one value, we can use the original scoring method in
(5) to promote honest reporting. We prove below that for any symmetric and bounded strictly
proper scoring rule, honest reporting strictly maximizes reviewers’ expected review scores un-
der the scoring method in (5) if and only if G is the mode of the observed signals, i.e., when
G(ti) = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k). Ties between observed signals are broken randomly.
Proposition 4. When observing multiple signals and reporting ri = G(ti), each reviewer i ∈
N with non-informative prior strictly maximizes his expected review score under the scoring
method in (5), for a symmetric and bounded strictly proper scoring rule R, if and only if ri =
argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k).
Proof. Recall that since each reviewer i ∈ N observes multiple signals, his true posterior predic-
tive distribution is equal to E [ω|α, ti] = Θ(ρ)i = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θv) as shown in (7). Due to Proposi-
tion 1 and since reviewers cannot affect their peers’ reviews because of the autonomy assumption,
we restrict ourselves to show that each reviewer i ∈ N maximizes E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
R
(
Φ
(1)
i , rj
)]
, for
j 6= i, if and only if ri = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k), where Φ
(1)
i = E [ω|α, ri = G(ti)].
Let z ∈ {0, . . . , v} be the most common signal observed by reviewer i. Hence, reviewer i’s
subjective probability associated with z is greater than his subjective probability associated with
any other signal y ∈ {0, . . . , v}, i.e., θi,z > θi,y.
(If part) Given that R is a symmetric and strictly proper scoring rule and that each reviewer
is reporting only one evaluation score, the resulting score from R
(
Φ
(1)
i , rj
)
can take on only
two possible values: δmax, if ri = rj , and δmin otherwise (see discussion in Section 4.3). When
reporting ri = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k) = z, reviewer i’s expected review score is
θi,zδmax +
∑
y 6=z θi,yδmin. Given that θi,z > θi,y, for any y 6= z, and δmax > δmin, this ex-
pected review score is maximized. Thus, reporting ri = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k) = z
maximizes reviewer i’s expected review score.
(Only-if part) Recall that all the elements making up the hyperparameter α have the same
value because reviewers’ prior distributions are non-informative. Let Φ(1)i = (φi,0, . . . , φi,v) be
reviewer i’s estimated posterior predictive distribution computed according to the original scoring
method in (5) when reviewer i is reporting ri = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k) = z, i.e.:
φi,k =
{
αk+1
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
= αk+1(v+1)·αk+1 if k = z,
αk
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
= αk(v+1)·αk+1 otherwise.
For contradiction’s sake, suppose that reviewer i maximizes his expected review score by
misreporting his review and reporting ri = y 6= z. Let Φ˜(1)i = (φ˜i,0, . . . , φ˜i,v) be reviewer i’s
estimated posterior predictive distribution when he is misreporting his review, i.e.:
φ˜i,k =
{
αk+1
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
= αk+1(v+1)·αk+1 if k = y,
αk
1+
∑v
x=0 αx
= αk(v+1)·αk+1 otherwise.
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As discussed in Section 4.3, the term R
(
Φ
(1)
i , rj
)
can take on only two possible values when-
ever R is a symmetric scoring rule. Consequently, R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , k
)
= R
(
Φ
(1)
i , k
)
for k 6= z, y. A
consequence of our assumption that reviewer i maximizes his expected review score by misre-
porting his review is that E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , rj
)]
≥ E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
R
(
Φ
(1)
i , rj
)]
. Assuming that R is a
symmetric and bounded proper scoring rule, this inequality becomes:
v∑
k=0
θi,kR
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , k
)
≥
v∑
k=0
θi,kR
(
Φ
(1)
i , k
)
=⇒
θi,zR
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , z
)
+ θi,yR
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , y
)
≥ θi,zR
(
Φ
(1)
i , z
)
+ θi,yR
(
Φ
(1)
i , y
)
=⇒
θi,y ≥ θi,z

R
(
Φ
(1)
i , z
)
−R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , z
)
R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , y
)
−R
(
Φ
(1)
i , y
)


The second line follows from the fact that R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , k
)
= R
(
Φ
(1)
i , k
)
for k 6= z, y. Re-
garding the last line, we have by construction that R
(
Φ
(1)
i , z
)
= R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , y
)
= δmax, and
R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , z
)
= R
(
Φ
(1)
i , y
)
= δmin. Consequently, we obtain that θi,y ≥ θi,z . As we stated
before, since z is the most common signal observed by reviewer i, then θi,z > θi,y. Thus, we have
a contradiction. So, E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
R
(
Φ˜
(1)
i , rj
)]
< E
Θ
(ρ)
i
[
R
(
Φ
(1)
i , rj
)]
, i.e., reviewer i maximizes his
expected review score only if he reports ri = argmaxx∈{0,...,v}
∑ρ
k=1H(x, ti,k) = z.
In other words, the above proposition says that each reviewer should report the evaluation score
most likely to be deserved by the manuscript when their prior distributions are non-informative and
they are rewarded according to the scoring method in (5). Any other evaluation score has a lower
associated subjective probability and, consequently, reporting it results in a lower expected review
score. To summarize, Proposition 4 implies that the scoring method proposed in (5) induces honest
reporting by rewarding agreements whenever reviewers’ prior distributions are non-informative
and the center is interested in the mode of each reviewer’s observed signals. It is noteworthy that
Proposition 4 does not assume that the center knows a priori the number of observed signals ρ,
thus providing more flexibility for practical applications of our method.
6 Finding a Consensual Review
After reviewers report their reviews and receive their review scores, there is still the question of
how the center will use the reported reviews in making a suitable decision. Since reviewers are not
always in agreement, belief aggregation methods must be used to combine the reported reviews
into a single representative review. The traditional average method is not necessarily the best
approach since unreliable reviewers might have a big impact on the aggregate review. Moreover,
a consensual review is desirable because it represents a review that is acceptable by all.
In this section, we propose an adaptation of a classical mathematical method to find a consen-
sual review. Intuitively, it works as if reviewers were constantly updating their reviews in order
to aggregate knowledge from others. The scoring concepts introduced in previous sections are
incorporated by the reviewers when updating their reviews. In what follows, for the sake of gener-
ality, we assume that reviewers evaluate the manuscript under ρ ∈ N+ criteria, i.e., each reviewer
i observes ρ signals from the underlying distribution that represents the quality of the manuscript
16
and report a vector ri = (ri,1, . . . , ri,ρ) of evaluation scores, where ri,k ∈ {0, . . . , v} for all k.
The center then estimates reviewers i’s posterior predictive distribution E [ω|α, ri], referred to as
Φ
(ρ)
i for ease of exposition, as in (8). We relax our basic model by allowing the evaluation scores
in the aggregate review to take on any real value between 0 and the best evaluation score v.
6.1 DeGroot’s Model
DeGroot [1974] proposed a model that describes how a group might reach a consensus by pooling
their individual opinions. When applying this model to a peer-review setting, each reviewer i is
first informed of others’ reported reviews. In order to accommodate the information and expertise
of the rest of the group, reviewer i then updates his own review as follows:
r
(1)
i =
n∑
j=1
wi,jrj
where wi,j is a weight that reviewer i assigns to reviewer j’s reported review when he carries out
this update. It is assumed that wi,j ≥ 0, for every reviewer i and j, and
∑n
j=1wi,j = 1. In this
way, each updated review takes the form of a linear combination of reported reviews, also known
as a linear opinion pool. The weights must be chosen on the basis of the relative importance that
reviewers assign to their peers’ reviews. The whole updating process can be written in a more
general form using matrix notation: R(1) =WR(0), where:
W =


w1,1 w1,2 · · · w1,n
w2,1 w2,2 · · · w2,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
wn,1 wn,2 · · · wn,n

 and R(0) =


r1
r2
.
.
.
rn

 =


r1,1 r1,2 · · · r1,ρ
r2,1 r2,2 · · · r2,ρ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
rn,1 rn,2 · · · rn,ρ


Since all the original reviews have changed, the reviewers might wish to update their new
reviews in the same way as they did before. If there is no basis for the reviewers to change their
assigned weights, the whole updating process after t revisions can then be represented as follows:
R(t) =WR(t−1) =WtR(0) (10)
Let r(t)i =
(
r
(t)
i,1 , . . . , r
(t)
i,ρ
)
be reviewer i’s review after t revisions, i.e., it denotes the ith row
of the matrix R(t). We say that a consensus is reached if and only if r(t)i = r
(t)
j , for every reviewer
i and j, when t→∞.
6.2 Review Scores as Weights
The original method proposed by DeGroot [1974] does not encourage honesty in a sense that
reviewers can assign weights to their peers’ reviews however they wish so as long as the weights
are consistent with the construction previously defined. Furthermore, it requires the disclosure of
reported reviews to the whole group when reviewers are weighting others’ reviews, a fact which
might be troublesome when the reviews are of a sensitive nature.
A possible way to circumvent the aforementioned problems is to derive weights from the
original reported reviews by taking into account review scores. In particular, we assume the weight
that a reviewer assigns to a peer’s review is directly related to how close their estimated posterior
predictive distributions are, where closeness is defined by an underlying proper scoring rule. We
provide behavioral foundations for such an assumption in the following subsection. Formally, the
weight that reviewer i assigns to reviewer j’s reported review is computed as follows:
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wi,j =
E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
∑n
j=1EΦ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
] (11)
that is, the weight wi,j is proportional to the expected review score that reviewer i would receive if
he had reported the review reported by reviewer j, where the expectation is taken with respect to re-
viewer i’s estimated posterior predictive distribution. Consequently, the weight that each reviewer
indirectly assigns to his own review is always the highest because R is a strictly proper scoring rule,
i.e., argmax
Φ
(ρ)
j
E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
= Φ
(ρ)
i . We assume that EΦ(ρ)i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
>
0, for every reviewer i and j. As long asR is bounded, this assumption can be met by appropriately
setting the value of λ. Consequently, 0 < wi,j < 1, for every i, j ∈ N . Moreover,
∑n
j=1wi,j = 1
because the denominator of the fraction in (11) normalizes the weights so they sum to one.
In the interest of reaching a consensus, DeGroot’s method in (10) is applied to the original
reported reviews using the weights as defined in (11). We show that a consensus is always reached
under this proposed method whenever the review scores are positive.
Proposition 5. If E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
> 0, for every reviewer i, j ∈ N , then r(t)i = r(t)j
when t→∞.
Proof. Due to the assumption that E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
> 0, for every reviewer i and j,
all the elements of the matrix W in (10) are strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one.
Moreover, the sum of the elements in any row is equal to one. Consequently, W can be regarded
as a n × n stochastic matrix, or a one-step transition probability matrix of a Markov chain with
n states and stationary probabilities. Furthermore, the underlying Markov chain is aperiodic and
irreducible. Therefore, a standard limit theorem of Markov chains applies in this setting, namely
given an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain with transition probability matrix W, every row
of the matrix Wt converges to the same probability vector when t→∞ [Ross, 1995].
Recall that r(t)i =
∑n
j=1wi,jr
(t−1)
j =
∑n
j=1wi,j
∑n
k=1wj,kr
(t−2)
k = · · · =
∑n
j=1 βjr
(0)
j ,
where β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) is a probability vector that incorporates all the previous weights. This
equality implies that the consensual review can be represented as an instance of the linear opinion
pool. Hence, an interpretation of the proposed method is that reviewers reach a consensus regard-
ing the weights in (10). When β = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n) in the above equality, the underlying
linear opinion pool becomes the average of the reported evaluation scores. A drawback with an
averaging approach is that it does not take into account the scoring concepts introduced in the pre-
vious sections, a fact which might favor unreliable reviewers. Moreover, disparate reviews might
have a big impact on the resulting aggregate review. On the other hand, under our approach to find
β, reviewers weight down reviews far from their own reviews, which implies that the proposed
method might be less influenced by disparate reviews. A numerical example in subsection 6.4
illustrates this point. The experimental results discussed in Section 7 show that our method to find
a consensual review is consistently more accurate than the traditional average method.
6.3 Behavioral Foundation
The major assumption regarding our method for finding a consensual review is that reviewers
assign weights according to (11). An interesting interpretation of (11) arises when the proper
scoring rule R is effective with respect to a metric M . Formally, given a metric M that assigns a
real number to any pair of probability vectors, which can be seen as the shortest distance between
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the two probability vectors, we say that a scoring rule R is effective with respect to M if the
following relation holds for all probability vectors Φ(ρ)i , Φ
(ρ)
j , and Φ
(ρ)
k [Friedman, 1983]:
M
(
Φ
(ρ)
i ,Φ
(ρ)
j
)
< M
(
Φ
(ρ)
i ,Φ
(ρ)
k
)
⇐⇒ E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
j , e
)
+ λ
]
> E
Φ
(ρ)
i
[
γR
(
Φ
(ρ)
k , e
)
+ λ
]
Thus, when R is effective with respect to a metric M , the higher the weight one reviewer
assigns to a peer’s review in (11), the closer their estimated posterior predictive distributions are
according to the metric M . In other words, when using effective scoring rules, reviewers naturally
prefer reviews close to their own reported reviews, and the weight that each reviewer assigns to
his own review is always the highest one. Hence, in spirit, the resulting learning model in (10) can
be seen as a model of anchoring [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974] in a sense that the review of a
reviewer is an “anchor”, and subsequent updates are biased towards reviews close to the anchor.
Friedman [1983] discussed some examples of effective scoring rules. For example, the quadratic
scoring rule in (3) is effective with respect to the root-mean-square deviation, the spherical scoring
rule is effective with respect to a renormalized L2-metric, whereas the logarithmic scoring rule is
not effective with respect to any metric [Nau, 1985].
6.4 Numerical Example
Consider a peer-review process where the best evaluation score is four (v = 4), three reviewers
(n = 3) observe three signals (ρ = 3), and they report the following reviews: r1 = (0, 1, 3),
r2 = (0, 2, 3), and r3 = (4, 4, 4). Consequently, the matrix R(0) in (10) is:
R(0) =

 0 1 30 2 3
4 4 4


Consider the hyperparameter α = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Hence, the estimated posterior predictive
distributions are Φ(3)1 = (2/8, 2/8, 1/8, 2/8, 1/8), Φ
(3)
2 = (2/8, 1/8, 2/8, 2/8, 1/8), and Φ
(3)
3 =
(1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 4/8). Assume that R in (11) is the quadratic scoring rule in (3), and let γ = 1
and λ = 1 in order for the resulting expected values in (11) to be always positive. We obtain:
W =

 0.3545 0.3455 0.30000.3455 0.3545 0.3000
0.3158 0.3158 0.3684


Focusing on the main diagonal of W, we notice that each reviewer always assigns the highest
weight to his own review. From the first row of W, we can see that reviewer 1 assigns a high
weight to his review and to reviewer 2’s review, and a lower weight to reviewer 3’s review. This
happens because reviewer 3’s review is very distant from the others’ reported reviews. We can
draw similar conclusions from the other rows. We then obtain the following weights when carrying
out DeGroot’s method with the weights calculated according to (11):
lim
t→∞
Wt =

 0.3390 0.3390 0.32200.3390 0.3390 0.3220
0.3390 0.3390 0.3220


and, consequently, the consensual review is represented by any row of the matrix limt→∞WtR(0),
which results in the vector (1.288, 2.305, 3.322). It is worthwhile to discuss an interesting point
regarding the above example. The aggregate review would be (1.333, 2.333, 3.333) if it was equal
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to the average of the reported reviews. Hence, reviewer 3’s review would have more impact on
the aggregate review because the evaluation scores in the average review are all greater than the
corresponding evaluation scores in the consensual review. In our proposed method, the influence
of reviewer 3 on the aggregate review is diluted because his review is very different from the
others’ reviews. More formally, reviewer 3’s estimated posterior predictive distribution is very
distant from the others’ estimated posterior predictive distributions when measured according to
the root-mean-square deviation, the metric associated with the quadratic scoring rule.
7 Experiments
In this section, we describe a peer-review experiment designed to test the efficacy of both the
proposed scoring method and the proposed aggregation method. In the following subsections,
we discuss Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, the platform used in our experiments, the experimental
design, and our results.
7.1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk5 (AMT) is an online labor market originally developed for human
computation tasks, i.e., tasks that are relatively easy for human beings, but nonetheless challeng-
ing or even currently impossible for computers, e.g., audio transcription, filtering adult content,
extracting data from images, etc. Several studies have shown that AMT can effectively be used as
a means of collecting valid data in these settings [Snow et al., 2008, Marge et al., 2010].
More recently, AMT has also been used as a platform for conducting behavioral experiments
[Mason and Suri, 2012]. One of the advantages that it offers to researchers is the access to a large,
diverse, and stable pool of people willing to participate in the experiments for relatively low pay,
thus simplifying the recruitment process and allowing a faster iteration between developing theory
and executing experiments. Furthermore, AMT provides an easy-to-use built-in mechanism to pay
workers that greatly reduces the difficulties of compensating individuals for their participation in
the experiments, and a built-in reputation system that helps requesters distinguish between good
and bad workers and, consequently, to ensure data quality. Numerous studies have shown that
results of behavioral studies conducted on AMT are comparable to results obtained in other online
domains as well as in offline settings [Buhrmester et al., 2011, Horton et al., 2011], thus providing
evidence that AMT is a valid means of collecting behavioral data.
7.2 Experimental Design
We designed a task on AMT that required workers, henceforth referred to as reviewers, to review 3
short texts under three different criteria: Grammar, Clarity, and Relevance. The first two texts were
extracts from published poems, but with some original words intentionally replaced by misspelled
words. The third text contained random words presented in a semi-structured way. All the details
regarding the texts are included in the appendix. For each text, three questions were presented to
the reviewers, each one having three possible responses ordered in decreasing negativity order:
• Grammar: does the text contain misspellings, syntax errors, etc.?
– A lot of grammar mistakes
– A few grammar mistakes
– No grammar mistakes
5http://www.mturk.com
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• Clarity: does the text, as a whole, make any sense?
– The text does not make sense
– The text makes some sense
– The text makes perfect sense
• Relevance: could the text be part of a poem related to love?
– The text cannot be part of a love poem
– The text might be part of a love poem
– The text is definitely part of a love poem
Words with subjective meaning were intentionally used so as to simulate the subjective nature
of the evaluation scores in a review, e.g., “a lot”, “a few”, etc. Each individual response was
translated into an evaluation score inside the set {0, 1, 2}. The most negative response received
the score 0, the middle response received the score 1, and the most positive response received the
score 2. Thus, each reviewer reported a vector of 9 evaluation scores (3 texts times 3 criteria).
We recruited 150 reviewers on AMT, all of them residing in the United States of America
and older than 18 years old. They were required to accomplish the task in at most 20 minutes.
Reviewers were split into 3 groups of equal size. After accomplishing the task, every reviewer in
every group received a payment of 20 cents. A study done by Ipeirotis [2010] showed that more
than 90% of the tasks on AMT have a baseline payment less than $0.10, and 70% of the tasks have
a baseline payment less than $0.05. Thus, our baseline payment was much higher than the average
payment from other jobs posted to the AMT marketplace.
Each reviewer was randomly assigned into one of the three groups. Reviewers in two of the
groups, the treatment groups, could earn an additional bonus of up to 10 cents. Reviewers in the
first treatment group, referred to as the Bonus Group (BG), were informed that their bonuses would
be proportional to the number of reviews similar to their reported reviews. Reviewers in the second
treatment group, the Bonus and Information Group (BIG), received similar information, but they
also received a short summary of some theoretical results presented in this paper:
“A group of researchers from the University of Waterloo (Canada) formally showed
that the best strategy to maximize your expected bonus in this setting is by being
honest, i.e., by considering each question thoroughly and deciding the best answers
according to your personal opinion”.
Members of the third group, the Control Group (CG), neither received extra explanations nor
bonuses. Their reported reviews were used as the control condition. Bonuses were computed by
rewarding agreements as described in Section 4.3. Due to the one-shot nature of this peer-review
task, we assumed that Dirichlet priors were non-informative with hyperparameter α = (1, 1, 1).
For each reported evaluation score, there could be at most 49 similar reported evaluation scores
because each group had 50 members. We then used the formula 109 ×
#agreements
49 to calculate the
reward for an individual evaluation score. Given that each reviewer reported 9 evaluation scores,
if the evaluation scores reported by all members of a group were the same, then all group members
would received the maximum bonus of 10 cents. The provided bonuses can be seen as review
scores. Our primary objective when performing this experiment was to empirically investigate the
extent to which providing review scores affects the quality of the reported reviews.
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7.3 Gold-Standard Evaluation Scores
Since the source and original content of each text were known a priori, i.e., before the experiments
were conducted, we were able to derive gold-standard reviews for each text. In order to avoid
confirmation bias6, we asked five professors and tutors from the English and Literature Department
at the University of Waterloo to provide their reviews for each text. We set the gold-standard
evaluation score for each criterion in a text as the median of the evaluation scores reported by
the professors and tutors. Coincidentally, each median value was also the mode of the underlying
evaluation scores. All the evaluation scores reported by the professors and tutors as well as the
respective gold-standard evaluation scores are in the appendix.
7.4 Hypotheses
Our first research question was whether or not providing review scores through pairwise compar-
isons makes the reported reviews more accurate, i.e., closer to the gold-standard reviews. Based
on our theoretical results, our hypothesis was:
Hypothesis 1. The average accuracy of group BIG is greater than the average accuracy of group
BG, which in turn is greater than the average accuracy of group CG.
In other words, the resulting reviews would be on average more accurate when reviewers re-
ceived review scores, and the extra explanation regrading the theory behind the scoring method
would provide more credibility to it, thus making the reviews more accurate. Regarding the result-
ing bonuses, since honest reporting maximizes reviewers’ expected review scores in our model,
our second hypothesis was:
Hypothesis 2. The average bonus received by members of group BIG is greater than the average
bonus received by members of group BG, which in turn is greater than the average bonus received
by members of group CG.
In order to test whether or not Hypothesis 2 was true, we used the bonus the members of group
CG would have received had they received any bonus. It is important to note that Hypothesis 1
was measured by comparing how close the reported reviews were to the gold-standard reviews,
whereas Hypothesis 2 was measured by making pairwise comparisons between reported reviews:
the higher the number of agreements, the greater the resulting bonus.
Another metric used to compare groups’ performance was the task completion time. The
amount of time spent by reviewers on the reviewing task can be seen as a proxy for the effort
they exerted to complete the task. Regarding this metric, we expected reviewers who received
review scores to be more cautious when completing their tasks. Moreover, the extra explanation
regrading the theory behind the scoring method would provide more credibility to it, thus making
the members of group BIG work harder on the task. Hence, our third hypothesis was:
Hypothesis 3. The average task completion time of group BIG is greater than the average task
completion time of group BG, which in turn is greater than the average task completion time of
group CG.
Finally, we believed that the consensual review, computed as described in Section 6, would be
more accurate than the average review since disparate reviews are less likely to have a big influence
on the consensual review than on the average review. Hence, our fourth hypothesis was:
Hypothesis 4. The average accuracy of the consensual review is greater than the average accu-
racy of the average review.
6The tendency to interpret information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions [Plous, 1993].
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Table 1: Accuracy of each group on individual criteria. The average of the absolute difference
between the reported evaluation scores and the corresponding gold-standard evaluation scores
is shown below each group. For each criterion, the lowest average is highlighted in bold. The
standard deviations are in parenthesis. One-tailed p-values resulting from rank-sum tests are
shown in the last three columns. Given the notation A-B, the null hypothesis is that the outcome
measures resulting from groups A and B are equivalent, and the alternative hypothesis is that the
outcome measure resulting from group A is less than the outcome measure resulting from group B.
p-values
BG BIG CG BIG-BG BIG-CG BG-CG
Grammar 0.5000 0.3200 0.4400 0.035** 0.110 0.726
(0.5051) (0.4712) (0.5014)
Text 1 Clarity 0.8200 0.6200 0.8600 0.065* 0.052* 0.413
(0.6606) (0.6024) (0.7287)
Relevance 0.2200 0.2000 0.3000 0.484 0.213 0.230
(0.5067) (0.4518) (0.5803)
Grammar 0.4400 0.3600 0.3800 0.209 0.420 0.729
(0.5014) (0.4849) (0.4903)
Text 2 Clarity 0.5000 0.3800 0.5400 0.155 0.067* 0.325
(0.6468) (0.6024) (0.6131)
Relevance 0.4400 0.6400 0.6600 0.977 0.419 0.014**
(0.5014) (0.4849) (0.4785)
Grammar 0.7600 0.7800 1.0200 0.539 0.077* 0.061*
(0.8466) (0.8640) (0.8449)
Text 3 Clarity 0.1400 0.0000 0.1600 0.006** 0.002** 0.301
(0.4046) (0.0000) (0.3703)
Relevance 0.1200 0.1000 0.2000 0.491 0.112 0.122
(0.4352) (0.3642) (0.4949)
* p ≤ 0.1
** p ≤ 0.05
7.5 Experimental Results
7.5.1 Accuracy on Individual Criteria
In our first analysis, we computed the absolute difference between each reported evaluation score
and the corresponding gold-standard evaluation score. Thus, the outcome measure was an integer
with a value between zero and two, and the closer this value was to zero, the better the resulting
accuracy. Table 1 shows the average accuracy of each group on individual criteria.
Focusing first on the groups BG and BIG, the group BIG is the most accurate group on all
criteria, except for the criterion Relevance in Text 2 and the criterion Grammar in Text 3. This
result is statistically significant with p-value ≤ 0.1 in three out of the seven cases in which BIG is
more accurate than BG. In two out of these three statistically significant cases, this result is also
statistically significant with p-value ≤ 0.05. BG is more accurate than BIG in only two criteria.
This result is only statistically significant for the criterion Relevance in Text 2 (p-value ≤ 0.05).
The group CG, the control condition that involved no incentives beyond the baseline compen-
sation offered for completing the task, never outperforms both BG and BIG at the same time, and
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Table 2: Aggregate accuracy of each group. The average of the sum of the absolute difference
between the reported evaluation scores and the corresponding gold-standard evaluation scores is
shown below each group. For each text and for the whole task, the lowest average is highlighted
in bold. The standard deviations are in parenthesis. One-tailed p-values resulting from rank-sum
tests are given in the last three columns. Given the notation A-B, the null hypothesis is that the
outcome measures resulting from groups A and B are equivalent, and the alternative hypothesis is
that the outcome measure resulting from group A is less than the outcome measure resulting from
group B.
p-values
BG BIG CG BIG-BG BIG-CG BG-CG
Text 1 1.5400 1.1400 1.6000 0.043** 0.085* 0.588
(1.1287) (1.0304) (1.4142)
Text 2 1.3800 1.3800 1.5800 0.547 0.163 0.148
(1.0669) (0.9666) (0.9916)
Text 3 1.0200 0.8800 1.3800 0.394 0.020** 0.052*
(1.1865) (0.9179) (1.1933)
Overall 3.9400 3.4000 4.5600 0.110 0.002** 0.064*
(2.2352) (1.6903) (2.1301)
* p ≤ 0.1
** p ≤ 0.05
it is the less accurate group in seven out of nine criteria. In two (respectively, four) occasions, CG
is statistically significantly less accurate than BG (respectively BIG) with p-value ≤ 0.1.
Giving these results, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 is true for individual criteria, i.e., the
resulting reviews are on average more accurate when using review scores, and the extra explana-
tion regrading the theory behind the scoring method seems to provide more credibility to it, thus
improving the accuracy of the reported reviews.
7.5.2 Aggregate Accuracy
We also computed the aggregate accuracy of each group for each text as well as for the whole
task. In the former case, the outcome measure was the sum of the absolute difference between
each reported evaluation score for a given text and the corresponding gold-standard evaluation
score. For example, given (0, 1, 2) as the reported evaluation scores for Text 1, and (1, 2, 2) as the
corresponding gold-standard evaluation scores, the outcome measure for Text 1 would be |0−1|+
|1 − 2| + |2 − 2| = 2. For the whole task, we summed the absolute differences across all criteria
and texts. Table 2 shows the aggregate accuracy of each group.
For every single text as well as for the overall task, members of the group CG report less
accurate reviews than members of the group BG and the group BIG. For the group BG, this result
is statistically significant for Text 3 and for the overall task (p-value ≤ 0.1). For the group BIG,
this result is statistically significant for Text 1 (p-value ≤ 0.1), Text 3 (p-value ≤ 0.05), and for the
whole task (p-value ≤ 0.05). Thus, the experimental results suggest that providing review scores
produces a significant improvement in quality over the control condition. Moreover, providing
an extra explanation about the theory behind the scoring method improves the final quality of
the reviews because, on average, the reviews from group BIG are more accurate than the reviews
from group BG. This result is statistically significant for Text 1 (p-value ≤ 0.05). Therefore, we
conclude that Hypothesis 1 is also true on the aggregate level.
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Table 3: Average bonus and completion time per group. The highest average values are high-
lighted in bold. The standard deviations are in parenthesis. One-tailed p-values resulting from
rank-sum tests are given in the last three columns. Given the notation A-B, the null hypothesis is
that the outcome measures resulting from groups A and B are equivalent, and the alternative hy-
pothesis is that the outcome measure resulting from group A is greater than the outcome measure
resulting from group B.
p-values
BG BIG CG BIG-BG BIG-CG BG-CG
Bonus 0.053 0.058 0.050 < 0.0005** <0.0005** 0.0025**
(0.0086) (0.0073) (0.0078)
Time 178.66 215.90 196.36 0.0232** 0.0257** 0.4208
(87.4495) (127.7471) (149.0788)
* p ≤ 0.1
** p ≤ 0.05
7.5.3 Bonus
The average bonus per group is shown in the first row of Table 3. From it, we conclude that
Hypothesis 2 is true, i.e., the average bonus received by members of BIG is greater than the average
bonus received by members of BG, which in turn is greater than the average bonus hypothetically
received by members of CG. All these results are statistically significant with p-value ≤ 0.05. In
other words, providing review scores and informing reviewers about the theory behind the scoring
method do indeed increase the number of reported reviews that are similar.
Interestingly, there is a strong negative correlation between bonuses and the aggregate absolute
error for the whole task shown in the fourth row of Table 2, even though the former is computed
by making pairwise comparisons between reported reviews, whereas the latter is computed by
comparing reported reviews with gold-standard reviews. The Pearson correlation coefficients for
BG, BIG, and CG are, respectively, −0.73, −0.79, and −0.72. This result implies that there exists
a strong positive correlation between honest reporting and accuracy in this task, a fact which is in
agreement with our theoretical model.
7.5.4 Completion Time
The average completion time per group is shown in the second row of Table 3. We start by noting
that Hypothesis 3 is not true. Surprisingly, the average time spent on the task by members of the
group BG is statistically equivalent to the average time spent by members of the group CG since
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The average completion time by members of the group
BIG is the highest one amongst the three groups, and this result is statistically significant with
p-value ≤ 0.05. A possible explanation for this result is that reviewers work on the reviewing task
more seriously by taking more time to complete it when they receive a brief explanation regarding
some theoretical results of the proposed scoring method, whereas they could be quickly guessing
how their peers would review the texts when the extra explanation about the theoretical results is
not provided.
It is noteworthy that even though the average values might suggest that spending more time
reviewing the texts results in higher bonuses and lower overall absolute errors, we do not find any
significant correlation between these variables at an individual level.
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Table 4: Accuracy of the average review (AVG) and the consensual review (CR) per group. The
average of the absolute difference between the aggregate evaluation scores and the corresponding
gold-standard evaluation scores is shown per group and criteria. For each criterion, the lowest
average absolute difference in each group is highlighted in bold. The standard deviations are in
parenthesis. A total of 1000 bootstrap resamples were used.
BG BIG CG
AVG CR AVG CR AVG CR
Grammar 0.2622 0.2781 0.1238 0.1086 0.1285 0.1307
(0.0920) (0.1015) (0.0680) (0.0631) (0.0800) (0.0829)
Text 1 Clarity 0.8219 0.8159 0.6211 0.6078 0.8633 0.8477
(0.0903) (0.0963) (0.0850) (0.0987) (0.1031) (0.1156)
Relevance 0.2188 0.1462 0.2020 0.1382 0.2996 0.2156
(0.0676) (0.0536) (0.0622) (0.0512) (0.0783) (0.0696)
Grammar 0.1643 0.1667 0.0754 0.0698 0.0716 0.0679
(0.0819) (0.0855) (0.0571) (0.0541) (0.545) (0.0531)
Text 2 Clarity 0.4965 0.4314 0.3812 0.3036 0.5405 0.5022
(0.0879) (0.0970) (0.0858) (0.0860) (0.0857) (0.0987)
Relevance 0.3590 0.3508 0.4360 0.4957 0.4996 0.5642
(0.0804) (0.0933) (0.0948) (0.1061) (0.0909) (0.0999)
Grammar 0.7598 0.6976 0.7792 0.7198 1.0231 1.0288
(0.1204) (0.1473) (0.1222) (0.1505) (0.1161) (0.1455)
Text 3 Clarity 0.1379 0.0859 0.0000 0.0000 0.1615 0.1115
(0.0565) (0.0400) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0522) (0.0453)
Relevance 0.1197 0.0699 0.1019 0.0597 0.2022 0.1320
(0.0619) (0.0400) (0.0521) (0.0335) (0.0696) (0.0537)
7.5.5 Consensus
Lastly, we tested the accuracy of the method proposed in Section 6 to find a consensual review.
We compared the resulting consensual review with the average review by using a bootstrapping
technique. For each group of reviewers, we randomly resampled with replacement reviews from
the original dataset so as to obtain bootstrap resamples. The size of each bootstrap resample was
equal to the size of the original dataset, i.e., each bootstrap resample contained 50 data points (the
original number of reviewers), each one consisting of 9 evaluation scores.
For each bootstrap resample, we aggregated evaluation scores individually using both the pro-
posed method for finding a consensual review and the average method. For each evaluation score,
the weight that each reviewer i assigned to reviewer j’s reported evaluation score was computed
according to equation (11). The proper scoring rule R and the constants γ and λ were set so as to
reward agreement as in Section 4.3. Given that the best evaluation score in this task was v = 2 and
α = (1, 1, 1), each element of a reviewer’s estimated posterior predictive distribution in (4) could
take on only two values: 0.25 and 0.5. Consequently, the numerator in (11) could take on only two
values: 0.5, if reviewer i and j’s reported evaluation scores were the same, and 0.25 otherwise.
After aggregating evaluation scores, we computed the accuracy of each aggregation method.
The outcome measure was the absolute difference between each aggregate evaluation score and
the corresponding gold standard score. Thus, the outcome measure was an integer with a value
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between zero and two, and the closer this value was to zero, the better the resulting accuracy.
Table 4 shows the average accuracy by group resulting from a total of 1000 bootstrap resamples.
Table 4 shows that consensual evaluation scores are more accurate than average evaluation
scores in 20 out of 27 cases, and equally accurate in one case. It comes as no surprise that con-
sensual evaluation scores are more accurate in groups where review scores were provided since
these groups reported more accurate reviews and their reported reviews were more similar, as
previously discussed. We performed a statistical analysis to investigate whether or not these dif-
ferences in accuracy are statistically significant. Since we used the same bootstrap resamples for
both aggregation methods, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used. The null hypothesis was that
the outcome measures resulting from both aggregation methods are equivalent. The alternative
hypothesis was that the outcome measure resulting from the consensual method was less than the
outcome measure resulting from the average method, which implies that the former is more ac-
curate than the latter. All the resulting 27 p-values are extremely small
(
< 10−10
)
. Therefore,
we conclude that Hypothesis 4 is indeed true, i.e., the proposed method for finding a consensual
review is, on average, more accurate than the average approach in this experiment. As discussed
in Section 6, we believe this result happens because disparate reported reviews are less likely to
have a big influence on the consensual review than on the average review.
8 Conclusion
We proposed a scoring method built on strictly proper scoring rules that induces honest reporting
when outcomes are not observable. We illustrated the mechanics behind our scoring method by
applying it to the peer-review process. In order to do so, we modeled the peer-review process
using a Bayesian model where the uncertainty regarding the quality of the manuscript is taken into
account. The main assumptions in our model are that reviewers cannot be influenced by other
reviewers, and reviewers are Bayesian decision-makers.
We then showed how our scoring method can be used to evaluate reported reviews and to
encourage honest reporting by risk-neutral reviewers. The proposed method assigns scores based
on how close reported reviews are, where closeness is defined by an underlying proper scoring rule.
Under the aforementioned assumptions, we showed that risk-neutral reviewers strictly maximize
their expected scores by honestly disclosing their reviews. We also proposed an extension of
our model and scoring method to scenarios where reviewers evaluate a manuscript under several
criteria. We discussed how honest reporting is related to accuracy in our model: when reviewers
report honestly, the distribution of reported reviews convergences to the distribution that represents
the quality of the manuscript as the number of reported reviews increases.
Since all reviews are not always in agreement, we suggested an adaptation of the method
proposed by DeGroot [1974] to find a consensual review. Intuitively, the proposed method works
as if the reviewers were going through several rounds of discussion, where in each round they are
informed about others’ reported reviews, and they update their own reviews using our predefined
method in order to reach a consensus. Formally, each updated review is a convex combination of
reported reviews, where review scores are used as part of the weights that reviewers assign to their
peers’ reviews. We showed that the resulting method always converges to a consensual review
when reviewers’ expected review scores are positive, and we provided behavioral foundations for
the aggregation method.
We tested the efficacy of both the proposed scoring method and the proposed aggregation
method on a peer-review experiment using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Our experimental results
corroborated the relationship between honest reporting and accuracy in our model. We empiri-
cally showed that providing review scores through pairwise comparisons results in more accurate
reviews than the traditional peer-review process, where reviewers have no direct incentives for ex-
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pressing their true reviews. Moreover, reviewers tended to agree more with each other when they
received review scores. In addition, our method for finding a consensual review outperformed the
traditional average method in our peer-review experiments.
For ease of exposition, our discussion on peer review was focused on scientific communica-
tion. However, our model and scoring method are readily applied to most peer-review settings,
e.g., academic courses, clinical peer review, etc. Moreover, our proposed method to incentivize
honest reporting is readily applied to different domains. For example, our method can be used to
incentivize honest feedback in reputation systems, where individuals rate a product/service after
experiencing it, and to induce honest evaluation of different strategic plans in an organization’s
strategic planning process. The proposed aggregation method is also general in a sense that it can
be applied to any decision analysis process where experts express their opinions through probabil-
ity distributions over a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive outcomes.
Given the positive results obtained in our peer-review experiments, an interesting open ques-
tion is whether or not the methods proposed in this paper would perform as well in other domains,
such as in the aforementioned reputation systems and strategic planning in organizations. Another
question worth contemplating is whether or not incentives other than from the received scores play
a role in our scoring method. For example, one can conjecture that altruism may play an important
role in our scoring method. In our peer-review experiments, the performance of the reviewers not
only affect their own review scores, but also the review scores of their peers. In other words, if
reviewers do not put enough effort into reporting high-quality reviews, not only might they re-
ceive low review scores, but other reviews evaluated based on those erroneous reviews might also
receive low review scores. Thus, an interesting future work is to investigate whether or not ex-
perts, in general, have an altruistic motive to put more effort into the underlying task in order to
maximize the potential payoffs of their peers.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the texts used in our experiments as well as the gold-standard reviews
reported by five professors and tutors from the English and Literature Department at the University
of Waterloo, henceforth referred to as the experts.
Text 1
An excerpt from the “Sonnet XVII” by Neruda [2007]. Intentionally misspelled words are high-
lighted in bold.
“I do not love you as if you was salt-rose, or topaz,
or the arrown of carnations that spread fire:
I love you as certain dark things are loved,
secretly, between the shadown and the soul”
Table 5 shows the evaluation scores reported by the experts. The gold-standard evaluation
score for each criterion is the median/mode of the reported evaluation scores.
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Table 5: Evaluation scores reported by the experts for Text 1.
Criterion Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Median/Mode
Grammar 1 0 1 0 1 1
Clarity 2 2 2 1 2 2
Relevance 2 2 2 2 2 2
Text 2
An excerpt from “The Cow” by Taylor et al. [2010]. Intentionally misspelled words are highlighted
in bold.
“THANK you, prety cow, that made
Plesant milk to soak my bread,
Every day and every night,
Warm, and fresh, and sweet, and white.”
Table 6 shows the evaluation scores reported by the experts. The gold-standard evaluation
score for each criterion is the median/mode of the reported evaluation scores.
Table 6: Evaluation scores reported by the experts for Text 2.
Criterion Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Median/Mode
Grammar 1 1 1 1 1 1
Clarity 2 2 2 1 2 2
Relevance 1 0 0 1 1 1
Text 3
Random words in a semi-structured way. Each line starts with a noun followed by a verb in a
wrong verb form. All the words in the same line start with a similar letter in order to mimic a
poetic writing style.
“Baby bet binary boundaries bubbles
Carlos cease CIA conditionally curve
Daniel deny disease domino dumb
Faust fest fierce forced furbished”
Table 7 shows the evaluation scores reported by the experts. The gold-standard evaluation
score for each criterion is the median/mode of the reported evaluation scores.
Table 7: Evaluation scores reported by the experts for Text 3.
Criterion Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Median/Mode
Grammar 0 1 0 0 0 0
Clarity 0 0 0 0 0 0
Relevance 0 1 0 0 0 0
29
References
AICPA: American Institute of CPAs. Peer Review Program Manual. 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/PeerReview.
J. Argenti. Corporate Planning: a Practical Guide. Number 2. Routledge, 1968.
D. F. Bacon, Y. Chen, I. Kash, D. C. Parkes, M. Rao, and M. Sridharan. Predicting Your Own
Effort. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
agent Systems, pages 695–702, 2012.
J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith. Bayesian Theory. John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
L. Bornmann, R. Mutz, and H. D. Daniel. Gender Differences in Grant Peer Review: A Meta-
Analysis. Journal of Informetrics, 1(3):226 – 238, 2007.
A. E. Budden, T. Tregenza, L. W. Aarssen, J. Koricheva, R. Leimu, and C. J. Lortie. Double-Blind
Review Favours Increased Tepresentation of Female Authors. Trends in Ecology and Evolution,
23(1):4–6, 2008.
M. D. Buhrmester, T. Kwang, and S. D. Gosling. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of
Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1):3–5, 2011.
A. Carvalho and K. Larson. Sharing a Reward Based on Peer Evaluations. In Proceedings of
the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 1455–
1456, 2010.
A. Carvalho and K. Larson. A Truth Serum for Sharing Rewards. In Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 635–642, 2011.
A. Carvalho and K. Larson. Sharing Rewards Among Strangers Based on Peer Evaluations. De-
cision Analysis, 9(3):253–273, 2012.
A. Carvalho and K. Larson. A Consensual Linear Opinion Pool. In Proceedings of the 23rd
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 2518–2524, 2013.
R. T. Clemen and R. L. Winkler. Combining Probability Distributions From Experts in Risk
Analysis. Risk Analysis, 19:187–203, 1999.
P. E. Dans. Clinical Peer Review: Burnishing a Tarnished Icon. Annals of Internal Medicine, 118
(7):566–568, 1993.
M. H. DeGroot. Reaching a Consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69(345):
118–121, 1974.
E. S. Epstein. A Scoring System for Probability Forecasts of Ranked Categories. Journal of
Applied Meteorology, 8(6):985–987, 1969.
M. E. Falagas, G. M. Zouglakis, and P. K. Kavvadia. How Masked Is the Masked Peer Review of
Abstracts Submitted to International Medical? Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 81(5):705, 2006.
D. Friedman. Effective Scoring Rules for Probabilistic Forecasts. Management Science, 29(4):
447–454, 1983.
T. Gneiting and A. E. Raftery. Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation. Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 102(477):359–378, 2007.
30
F. Godlee, T. Jefferson, M. Callaham, J. Clarke, D. Altman, H. Bastian, C. Bingham, and J. Deeks.
Peer Review in Health Sciences. BMJ books London, 2003.
R. Hanson. Combinatorial Information Market Design. Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1):107–
119, 2003.
J. J. Horton, D. G. Rand, and R. J. Zeckhauser. The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments
in a Real Labor Market. Experimental Economics, 14(3):399–425, 2011.
S.-W. Huang and W.-T. Fu. Enhancing Reliability Using Peer Consistency Evaluation in Human
Computation. In Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative
Work, pages 639–648, 2013.
P. G. Ipeirotis. Analyzing the Amazon Mechanical Turk Marketplace. XRDS Crossroads: The
ACM Magazine for Students, 17(2):16–21, 2010.
R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful. Journal of Artificial Intelli-
gence Research, 34:209–253, 2009.
A. C. Justice, M. K. Cho, M. A. Winker, J. A. Berlin, D. Rennie, and The PEER Investigators.
Does Masking Author Identity Improve Peer Review Quality?: A Randomized Controlled Trial.
Journal of the American Medical Association, 280(3):240–242, 1998.
S. Lock. A Difficult Balance: Editorial Peer Review in Medicine. Nuffield Provincial Hospitals
Trust, 1985.
LSC: Legal Services Commission. Independent Peer Review. 2005. Retrieved from
http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/civil/how/mq_peerreview.asp.
M. Marge, S. Banerjee, and A. I. Rudnicky. Using the Amazon Mechanical Turk for Transcription
of Spoken Language. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics
Speech and Signal Processing, pages 5270–5273, 2010.
W. Mason and S. Suri. Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Behavior
Research Methods, 44(1):1–23, 2012.
N. Miller, P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser. Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction
Method. Management Science, 51(9):1359–1373, 2005.
A. H. Murphy. A Note on the Ranked Probability Score. Journal of Applied Meteorology, 10(1):
155–156, 1970.
Y. Nakazono. Strategic Behavior of Federal Open Market Committee Board Members: Evidence
from Members’ Forecasts. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93:62–70, 2013.
R. F. Nau. Should Scoring Rules Be “Effective”? Management Science, 31(5):527–535, 1985.
D. J. Navarro, T. L. Griffiths, M. Steyvers, and M. D. Lee. Modeling Individual Differences with
Dirichlet Processes. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 50(2):101–122, 2006.
P. Neruda. 100 Love Sonnets. Exile, Bilingual edition, 2007.
N. S. Newcombe and M. E. Bouton. Masked Reviews Are Not Fairer Reviews. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 4(1):62–64, 2009.
L. Pappano. The Year of the MOOC. New York Times, page ED26, November 4th, 2012.
31
S. Plous. The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, 1993.
D. Prelec. A Bayesian Truth Serum for Subjective Data. Science, 306(5695):462–466, 2004.
R. B. Primack and R. Marrs. Bias in the Review Process. Biological Conservation, 141(12):
2919–2920, 2008.
G. Radanovic and B. Faltings. A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Non-Binary Signals. In
Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013.
R. Robinson. Calibrated Peer Review. The American Biology Teacher, 63(7):474–480, 2001.
M. Roos, J. Rothe, and B. Scheuermann. How to Calibrate the Scores of Biased Reviewers by
Quadratic Programming. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pages 255–260, 2011.
S. M. Ross. Stochastic Processes (Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics). Wiley, 2 edition,
1995.
A. D. Shaw, J. J. Horton, and D. L. Chen. Designing Incentives for Inexpert Human Raters. In
Proceedings of the ACM 2011 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, pages
275–284, 2011.
R. Snow, B. O’Connor, D. Jurafsky, and A. Y. Ng. Cheap and Fast—But is it Good? Evaluating
Non-Expert Annotations for Natural Language Tasks. In Proceedings of the Conference on
Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, pages 254–263, 2008.
C.-A. S. Stae¨l von Holstein. A Family of Strictly Proper Scoring Rules Which Are Sensitive to
Distance. Journal of Applied Meteorology, 9(3):360–364, 1970.
J. Taylor, A. Taylor, and K. Greenaway. Little Ann and Other Poems. Nabu Press, 2010.
A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185
(4157):1124–1131, 1974.
S. van Rooyen. The Evaluation of Peer-Review Quality. Learned Publishing, 14(2):85–91, 2001.
S. van Rooyen, N. Black, and F. Godlee. Development of the Review Quality Instrument (RQI) for
Assessing Peer Reviews of Manuscripts. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 52(7):625 – 629,
1999.
R. R. J. Weiss. Optimally Aggregating Elicited Expertise: A Proposed Application of the Bayesian
Truth Serum for Policy Analysis. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009.
C. Wenneras and A. Wold. Nepotism and Sexism in Peer-Review. Nature, 387:341–343, 1997.
R. L. Winkler and A. H. Murphy. “Good” Probability Assessors. Journal of Applied Meteorology,
7(5):751–758, 1968.
J. Witkowski and D. C. Parkes. A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations. In Pro-
ceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012.
A. Yankauer. How Blind is Blind Review? American Journal of Public Health, 81(7):843–845,
1991.
32
